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ABSTRACT
Gali and Rabanal provide statistical evidence that, in their view, puts into question the real business-
cycle paradigm in favor of the sticky-price paradigm. I demonstrate that their statistical procedure
is easily misled in that they would reach the same conclusions even if their data had been simulated
from an RBC model. I also demonstrate that sticky-price models do a poor job generating U.S.-like
business cycles with only shocks to technology, the federal funds rate, and government consumption.
This explains why Gali and Rabanal need large unobserved shocks to preferences and to the degree
of monopoly power.
∗This discussion was prepared for the 2004 NBER Macroeconomics Annual. I received very helpful comments
from my colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Data, codes, and notes used in this project
are available at my website (minneapolisfed.org/research). The views expressed herein are those of the author
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
An important task of macroeconomists is the development of models that account for
specic features of the business cycle. All policymakers would agree that having reliable
models to analyze the eects of policy is useful. In taking on the important endeavor of
developing reliable models, I applaud Gali and Rabanal (GR hereafter). I do, however,
dispute some of their key ndings.
GR survey research in the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) literature empha-
sizing the role of technology for the business cycle. (See the many references in GR's Section
2.2.) The ndings of this literature are used to dismiss a line of business-cycle research be-
ginning with Kydland and Prescott's (1982) \real business cycle" (RBC) model. The claim
is that the data clearly show that RBC models are inconsistent in crucial ways with the ob-
served behavior of the United States economy in the postwar period. This claim amounts
to asserting that no RBC model can produce time series for key macro aggregates|namely
productivity and hours|that have similar patterns to those in U.S. data. The SVAR liter-
ature arrives at this claim by estimating empirical impulse responses and noting that the
responses are dierent from the theoretical impulse responses in most RBC models.
In these comments, I argue that the claim of the SVAR literature is incorrect. I do
this by estimating a standard RBC model with maximum likelihood for U.S. data. My
estimation procedure ensures that the model can account for the patterns of productivity
and hours in the data. With this RBC model, I then show that the SVAR procedure is easily
misled. I simulate time series for the model (many times), apply the SVAR procedure,
and estimate empirical impulse responses. I show that these empirical impulse responses
look very similar to those estimated in the literature. Thus, given data simulated from
my model, the SVAR procedure would wrongly conclude that the data were not simulated
from a real business cycle model.
The problem with trying to use the SVAR procedure to make broad claims about a
class of models, like the entire class of RBC models, is the following: most RBC models do
not satisfy the narrow set of identifying assumptions typically made in the SVAR literature.
My estimated RBC model is no exception. Hence, the SVAR procedure is misspecied with
respect to most of the models it tries to shed light on.
On this point, I think there is some agreement between Gali and Rabanal and myself.1
1 See \Addendum: A Response to Ellen McGrattan" where Gali and Rabanal note that \a misidentied
1The SVAR procedure is not useful for evaluating models or classes of models that do not
satisfy the SVAR's precise identifying assumptions. I conclude from this that since we
do not know the assumptions a priori, SVARs are not a useful guide to developing new
models. Moreover, since we do not know the identifying assumptions a priori, the SVAR
cannot robustly identify how the economy responds to shocks, like technology or monetary
shocks. SVARs are potentially useful but only for classes of models which satisfy all of
the identifying assumptions. In every application of which I am aware, the class of models
that satisfy the explicit or implicit identifying assumptions of the SVAR procedure is an
extremely small subset of the class of interesting models.
The false rejection of the RBC model motivates the second part of GR's study, a study
of business cycles using a model with sticky prices. Unfortunately, like many other studies
in the sticky-price literature, GR do not include investment in their model. I introduce
investment into a version of their model and analyze its predictions for business cycles.
I nd that technology shocks, monetary shocks, and government consumption shocks are
of little importance in the sticky-price model. This explains why GR nd that preference
shocks and shocks to the degree of monopoly power play such a large role for aggregate
uctuations.
2. The Death Knell for RBC Theory
Gali and Rabanal rst review the SVAR literature that considers the t of real business
cycle models and the role of technology shocks for business cycles. They ask, How well does
the RBC model t postwar U.S. data? The answer they give is `not so well.' According to
evidence from the SVARs, hours fall in response to technology shocks and the contribution
of technology shocks to the business cycle is small. In standard RBC models, the opposite
is true. Francis and Ramey (2002), who have contributed to the SVAR literature that GR
review, summarize the ndings of this literature by saying that \the original technology-
driven real business hypothesis does appear to be dead."
and/or misspecied SVAR often leads to incorrect inference. ... In those cases the nding of incorrect
inference is neither surprising nor novel, since it restates points that have already been made in the
literature."
22.1. Applying Blanchard-Quah
Let me start by summarizing how researchers in the SVAR literature reach the conclusion
that RBC theory is not consistent with U.S. data. It is a direct application of Blanchard
and Quah (1989). They estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) using data on labor
productivity and hours, invert it to get a moving average (MA) representation, and impose
certain \structural" assumptions about the shocks hitting the economy. They then argue
that the empirical impulse responses from the structural MA are very dierent from the
theoretical impulse responses of a standard RBC model. Furthermore, they show that the
contribution of technology shocks to output uctuations is empirically small, a prediction
at odds with standard RBC theories.
To be more precise, let Xt be a two-dimensional vector containing the change in the
log of labor productivity and the change in the log of hours. The rst step is to estimate a
vector autoregression by regressing Xt on a certain number of lags. GR chose four. They
invert this VAR to get the corresponding Wold moving average,
Xt = vt + B1vt 1 + B2vt 2 + ::: (2:1)
where vt is the residual from the VAR and Evtv0
t = 
. Mechanically, it is easy to recursively
compute the B coecients having estimates of the VAR coecients. An estimate of the
matrix 
 is easily constructed from the VAR residuals.
One more step is needed to derive the structural MA. The goal is to work with an
MA process that has interpretable shocks, namely a shock they call a \technology" shock,
and a shock they call a \demand" shock. In particular, the structural MA they use is
Xt = C0et + C1et 1 + C2et 2 + ::: (2:2)
where Eete0
t = , et = C
 1
0 vt, and Cj = BjC0 for j  1. The rst element of et is the
technology shock and the second element is the demand shock.
We need identifying restrictions to determine the seven parameters in C0 and .
Seven restrictions typically used in the SVAR literature that GR review are as follows.
Three come from equating variance-covariance matrices (C0C0
0 = 
). Three come from
assuming that the shocks are orthogonal ( = I). The last comes from the assumption
that demand shocks have no long-run eect on labor productivity (
P
j Cj(1;2) = 0).
With these restrictions imposed, I can compute the empirical impulse responses. Since


































Figure 1. SVAR Impulse Response of U.S. Total Hours to Technology
(Dashed lines mark upper and lower values of the 95%
condence band for bootstrapped standard errors)
the nonfarm business sector as GR do, but with gross domestic product (GDP) and total
hours.2 In Figure 1, I show the response of total hours to a one-time, one-percent innovation
in technology (that is, a one-percent increase in the rst element of e0). I also plot the 95
percent condence bands computed using the method described by Runkle (1987). Using
the aggregate series for productivity and hours is not a problem for GR, since I reach
the same conclusions as they do. In particular, Figure 1 shows that hours fall on impact
in response to a rise in technology. In standard RBC models, hours rise on impact in
response.
A second statistic that is emphasized in the literature is the contribution of technology
to the variance of logged output and hours, which is computed after these series are ltered
with a band-pass lter. With data from the nonfarm business sector, GR nd that only 7
percent of output uctuations and 5 percent of hours uctuations are due to technology.
For my example with GDP and total hours, I nd that 14 percent of output uctuations
and 9 percent of hours uctuations are due to technology. Thus, like GR, I nd that the
2 See McGrattan 2004 for data sources.
4SVAR predicts that technology plays a small role in the business cycle.
2.2. A Standard RBC Model
I am going to evaluate the SVAR ndings using a standard RBC model. In particular,
I work with a version of the model in McGrattan (1994) with parameters estimated by
maximum likelihood for U.S. data. I simulate many time series from that model, and I
apply the SVAR procedure to the articial data. This exercise allows me to compare the
SVAR statistics to their theoretical counterparts. I also determine if the SVAR recovers
the technology shocks that I feed into the model.
The model economy is a standard growth model with households, rms, and a gov-
ernment. The representative household with Nt members in period t chooses per-capita







t [ct(1   lt) )1    1]=(1   )Nt
subject to ct + (1 + xt)xt = rtkt + (1   lt)wtlt + Tt
Nt+1kt+1 = [(1   )kt + xt]Nt
ct;xt  0 in all states
taking initial capital k0 and processes for the rental rate r, wage rate w, the tax rates x
and l, and transfers Tt as given. I assume that Nt grows at rate n.




t (ZtLt)1    rtKt   wtLt: (2:3)
where  is the share of capital in production, capital letters denote economy aggregates,
and Zt is the level of technology which varies stochastically around a constant growth
trend. In particular, I assume that Zt = (1+z)tzt where z is the trend growth rate and
zt is stochastic. Total factor productivity in this economy is Z
1 
t .
The government sets rates of taxes and transfers in such a way that it can nance a
stochastic sequence of per-capita purchases gt and satisfy its budget constraint,
Ntgt + NtTt = Nt[ltwtlt + xtxt]
5Table 1
Parameters of Vector AR(1) Stochastic Process for the Modely
Estimated Using Maximum Likelihood with Data on















































































Mean(st) = [ :122(:0306); :235(:0172); :218(:0201);  1:710(:0384)]
y Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
each period. In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold:




The model has four exogenous shocks, namely total factor productivity, a tax on labor,
a tax on investment, and government spending. The process governing these shocks is
st+1 = P0 + Pst + Qt+1; (2:5)
where st = [logzt, lt; xt; loggt tlog(1+z)]. I compute maximum likelihood estimates
for P0, P, and Q using data on U.S. output, investment, hours, and government spending
for the period 1959:1{2003:4.3 These estimates are reported in Table 1.
3 I xed parameters of utility and technology as follows:   = 2:24,  = 1,  = :9722,  = :35,  = :0464,
n = 1:5%, and z = 1:6%. These values are standard in the literature. I also restrict measurement
errors in observed data to be very small. See McGrattan (2004) for further details.
62.3. The Model Predictions
Given estimates for the parameters, I compute an equilibrium for the model economy which
implies decision rules for ct, xt, lt, and kt+1 in terms of the state variables kt, zt, lt, xt,
and gt (once I have detrended all variables that grow over time).
I can use these decision rules to compute impulse responses and contributions to
the output spectrum for each of the four shocks. Because P and Q are not diagonal,
a specication soundly rejected by a likelihood ratio test, estimates of the theoretical
impulse responses and the contributions to the spectrum depend on how I decompose
QQ0 (or, equivalently, how I order s keeping Q lower triangular). For the estimated
parameters in Table 1, dloglt=dlogz;t is positive for all decompositions, where z;t is the
rst element of t. In terms of the contributions to the output spectrum, technology shocks
are important no matter how I assign covariances. The contribution, averaged across all
possible assignments, is over 35 percent. If I compute the contributions for all examples
with z rst in s and Q lower triangular, I nd that the average contribution of technology
to the output spectrum is 70 percent. Thus, as most RBC models predict, hours rise in
response to a technology shock and technology shocks are important contributors to the
business cycle.
Given the empirical ndings of the SVAR, GR and others they survey conclude that
RBC models such as the one I just described are simply not consistent with U.S. data.
2.4. The Death Knell for the SVAR Procedure?
I now describe an obvious check on the SVAR methodology. I act as the data generating
process and let the SVAR user be the detective. This is a game I play when I teach
students at the University of Minnesota. I give the students \data" for an economy of my
own making and they have to tell me what is driving uctuations in that economy.
With my RBC model, I draw 1000 random sequences of length 180 for the  vector
in (2:5). I use decision functions to compute 1000 sequences for productivity and hours. I
then apply the SVAR procedure to each model simulation to get impulse responses. The
result is displayed in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the mean responses (with a solid line).
The dashed lines mark the upper and lower value of the interval containing 95 percent of
the responses. They are obtained by eliminating the top 2.5 percent and the bottom 2.5



































95% of Impulse Responses Within Bands
Mean of Impulse Responses
Figure 2. SVAR Impulse Response of Model Hours to Technology
Figure 2 shows that for most of the simulations, and on average, a researcher using
the SVAR procedure would infer that hours fall in response to a positive technology shock.
This is the same inference I would make for the U.S. data using this procedure. (See Figure
1.) If I compute the contribution of technology to the variance of logged output and hours
(after applying a band-pass lter), I nd that a researcher using the SVAR procedure would
infer that the fractions of the variance of logged output and hours are 26.7 percent and 6
percent, respectively. Recall that when I apply the SVAR to U.S. data the contributions
of technology to output and hours uctuations are 14 percent and 9 percent, respectively.
Because hours fall in response to a positive technology shock and because the contribution
of technology to the business cycle is smaller than RBC theory predicts, an SVAR user
would conclude that the data could not have come from an RBC model. But the data did
come from an RBC model.
Figure 2 should not be surprising given the parameters of the model are maximum
likelihood estimates for the U.S. data. It simply reects the fact that my RBC model
can produce time series for the key macro aggregates that have similar patterns to those
in the U.S. data. In fact I could think of the U.S. data as one draw of time series from
8the model because I can choose the sequence of four shocks in t to exactly match the
observed sequences for output, investment, labor, and government consumption. Unless
the U.S. data were unlikely given my probability model, I should get SVAR results similar
to those reported in Figure 1. It turns out that they are not unlikely.
In the exercise leading up to Figure 2, I treated tax rates as unobserved. These tax
rates can be interpreted as summarizing all distortions to factors of production. However,
one could do the same exercise with measures of a key component of these distortions,
namely income taxes on labor and capital. In McGrattan (1994), I use data from the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. national accounts to construct estimates for
taxes on capital and labor. I estimate the parameters of the model with tax rates observed
and show that the model produces time series for key macro aggregates that have similar
patterns to those in the U.S. data. A good t between U.S. data and the model time series
implies an empirical impulse response like that in Figure 1 if I apply the SVAR procedure
to simulated time series of the model.
What if I compare the technology implied by the SVAR procedure to the log of total
factor productivity implied by the model? Technology backed out using the SVAR is the
cumulative sum of the rst element of et in (2:2). The log of technology implied by the
model is logZt in (2:4) computed with U.S. data for Y , K, and L. In Figure 3, I plot the
two series after applying the Hodrick-Prescott lter. The gure shows that the SVAR does
not back out the true technology.
In fact, the realization of their technology has very dierent properties than its theo-
retical counterpart. It is barely correlated with GDP and negatively correlated with total
hours. The correlations with GDP and hours are 0.42 and -0.04, respectively. The true
technology is highly correlated with GDP and positively correlated with total hours. The
correlations with GDP and hours are 0.84 and 0.43, respectively.
2.5. Why Does the SVAR Get It So Wrong?
The literature that directly or indirectly critiques the SVAR approach gives us many pos-
sible answers to this question.4 The problem could be mistaken assumptions about the
dimension of the shock vector. It could be mistaken assumptions about the orthogonality
4 See, for example, Sims (1971, 1972), Hansen and Sargent (1991), Lippi and Reichlin (1993), Faust




























Figure 3. Technology Shocks from the Model and Those Predicted by the SVAR
of the shocks. It could be mistaken assumptions about whether growth trends are deter-
ministic or stochastic. It could be mistaken assumptions about the long-run implications
of non-technology shocks. It could be that data samples are too short. It could be that
four lags in the VAR are not enough. It could be a more subtle problem like the lack of
invertibility of the RBC model's theoretical MA. In fact, for the example above, which
is based on a standard RBC model and an SVAR procedure that has been applied many
times, the answer is: all of the above.
SVARs are held up as useful tools that reveal \facts" about the data without having
to get into the messy details of economic theories. Typically these \facts" are then used
to point researchers in the direction of a promising class of models and away from models
that are not consistent with them. If the identifying assumptions of the SVAR are relevant
for only a tiny subset of models within a class of models, then claims should be made in
the context of the tiny subset.
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004) extend the analysis I have done here and show
that mistaken inferences are large even if my RBC model is restricted to satisfy the key
identifying assumptions laid out in Section 2.1. That is, we restrict the model to have only
10two orthogonal shocks: the technology shock Zt and the tax rate lt (or \demand shock"),
with a unit root in Zt and an autoregressive process for lt. We show that auxiliary
assumptions that SVAR researchers make are not innocuous. For the technology-driven
SVAR analyzed by GR and many others, an important assumption is the number of lags
in the VAR. If capital accumulation is a central component of the model, we show that
hundreds of lags are needed to detect the true impulse responses. The sample we have, on
the other hand, is only 180 periods long. This is an important nding since the model being
studied is the growth model, the workhorse of applied macroeconomic research. Perhaps
this nding is the death knell of SVAR analysis.
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004) also show that the RBC model of Section 2.2
encompasses the statistical model generated by the SVAR. That is, if the data comes from
this RBC model we can account for the prediction of the SVAR that hours fall on impact
when there is a positive technology shock. The SVAR model, on the other hand, does
not encompass the RBC model since it cannot be used to make predictions about many
of the statistics of interest to business cycle researchers, such as the relative variance of
investment to output.
Let me summarize what I have learned from these exercises. We should not view the
empirical impulse responses from an SVAR as something we want our theoretical impulse
responses to reproduce. SVAR users can and should do the same diagnostic checks as
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004). The analysis has to be done within the context of
a theoretical model or a class of theoretical models. Of course, this brings us full circle:
once we construct a theoretical model, there is no reason to use an SVAR.
3. A Triple-Sticky Model vs. U.S. Facts
The second part of Gali and Rabanal's paper considers life \after RBC models" (which
was the original title of the paper). They describe a model that, at least for some pa-
rameterizations, is consistent with the VAR evidence laid out in the rst part of their
paper. This model, which I call the \triple-sticky" model has sticky prices, sticky wages,
and habit persistence (\sticky consumption"). They estimate the model and report the
contributions of dierent shocks to aggregate uctuations. From that, they conclude that
demand factors|not technological factors|are key for business cycles.
113.1. A Forgotten Lesson From RBC Theory
Before discussing the triple-sticky business-cycle model, I should review an important
lesson from the RBC literature. GR's triple-sticky model includes lots of frictions. Unfor-
tunately, it excludes the key component in modern business cycle models: investment.
One important lesson from previous business-cycle research is that the main impact
of technology on the cycle is through investment, not through hours. By leaving out
investment, GR are minimizing the role that technology would have. For this reason, I
bring investment back in.
3.2. A Triple-Sticky Model with Investment
The model I work with has many of the same elements as those in Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2000, 2002) and McGrattan (1999). In order to compare my results to those
of GR, I also allow for habit persistence in consumer preferences and preference shocks.
3.3. Eects of Monetary Shocks
One of the main results in GR is that demand shocks are the main force for the business
cycle. Given the choice of model used by GR, it is natural to ask if money is an important
demand shock. Nominal rigidities let money shocks have real eects, and habit persistence
extends the eects.
To investigate the role of money, I compare time series from data (after detrending or
demeaning) with time series from my triple-sticky model. I set parameters to be consistent
with GR's model wherever possible and otherwise use standard estimates from the business
cycle literature. In Figures 4 and 5, I show simulations of the model hit only by shocks
to the Taylor rule (A:8). For the sequence of shocks, I use innovations from Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler's (2000) estimated Taylor rule. The gures conrm the nding of GR
that monetary shocks in these models play only a small role. Even if I do not add habit
persistence, the model predictions are far too smooth relative to the uctuations in the
data.
If I include plausible shocks to technology and government spending, the match be-
tween actual and predicted improves slightly.5 But ination in the model is still much























































Figure 5. Ination Relative to its Mean
13smoother than in the data. Thus, any missing \demand" shocks must ll in the gap be-
tween actual and predicted ination, which was particularly large in the 1970s and early
1980s.
3.4. What are the Demand Shocks?
If it is not money, government spending, or technology, what drives business cycle uctu-
ations? The answers for GR are preference shocks and shocks to the degree of monopoly
power. For GR, these unobserved \demand" shocks account for 80 percent of the variance
in hours, 72 percent of the variance in output, and 65 percent of the variance in ination.
As I nd with my triple-sticky model, observed factors account for a very small fraction
of the business cycle.
This is reminiscent of the nding of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). To generate
U.S.-like business cycles, Rotemberg and Woodford need large and variable shocks to
preferences and to a variable called aggregate demand appearing in the resource constraint.
In the appendix to their paper they report that standard deviations of the shocks to
preferences are 13.7 percent. This is large relative to the standard deviation of logged
output which is only 2.1 percent.
The uctuations of aggregate demand shocks, which are shocks to the resource con-
straint and enter additively with consumption, are even larger. The standard deviation is
29.5 percent, 14 times that of logged output. Furthermore, plotting the aggregate demand
shocks yields a picture that looks a lot like ination. This is not surprising since there is
a large gap between actual and predicted ination without the unobserved shocks.
In summary, given my calculations and those of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), I
was not surprised that GR nd they need a large role for unobserved preference shocks
and shocks to the degree of monopoly power. I am not convinced that this is progress. It
seems to me that we are simply replacing an old black box (\technology shocks") with a
new black box (\demand shocks").
4. Conclusions
GR have written a thought-provoking paper claiming that RBC models are not consistent
with U.S. data. I have shown that the SVAR methodology they use fails a simple diagnostic
14test. When given data from an RBC model, the SVAR procedure tells us that the data
could not have come from an RBC model.
I have analyzed a version of GR's triple-sticky model, extending it to include invest-
ment. Like GR, I nd that the model does a poor job generating U.S.-like business cycles
with only technology and monetary shocks. The t of GR's model to U.S. data, there-
fore, requires the inclusion of large unobserved shocks to preferences and to the degree of
monopoly power.
Finally, I should note that the RBC literature has moved far beyond Kydland and
Prescott (1982). Current research is modeling sources of variation in total factor produc-
tivity in large part as arising from variations in government policies, not from variations
in the stock of blueprints.6 This work came about partly in response to claims that total
factor productivity in Kydland and Prescott (1982) was an exogenous black box. I encour-
age GR to consider these recent studies before shifting the black box from technology to
demand.
6 See for example, Parente and Prescott (2000), Lagos (2003), and Schmitz (2004).
15A. Appendix
This appendix provides details of the triple-sticky model I simulate. For details on com-
putation, see McGrattan (2004).
In each period t, the model economy experiences one of nitely many events st. I
denote by st = (s0;:::;st) the history of events up through and including period t. The
probability, as of period zero, of any particular history st is (st). The initial realization
s0 is given.
There are producers of nal goods and intermediate goods. Final goods producers
behave competitively and solve a static prot-maximization problem. In each period pro-











where y is the nal good, P is the price of the nal good, y(i) are intermediate goods, and
P(i) are the prices of the intermediate goods. The demand for intermediate goods, which
I use later, is given by y(i) = [P=P(i)]
1
1 y:
Consider next the problem faced by intermediate goods producers. Intermediate goods
producers are monopolistically competitive. They set prices for their goods, but they must
hold them xed for N periods. I assume that price-setting is done in a staggered fashion so
that 1=N of the rms are setting in a particular period. I compute a symmetric equilibrium
so I assume that all rms i 2 [0;1=N] behave the same way, all rms i 2 [1=N;2=N] behave
the same way, and so on.
More specically, the problem solved by the intermediate goods producers setting
prices is to choose sequences of prices P(i), capital stocks k(i), investments x(i), and labor



































16the law of motion for capital used in producing good i











P(i;st+N) = P(i;st+N+1) = :::P(i;st+2N 1) (A:6)
and so on, where ~ Q(s) is the th period Arrow-Debreu price (that is, a product of the
one-period Q(stjst 1)'s).
Consider next the problem faced by consumers of nal goods who are wage-setters.
One can think of the economy organized into a continuum of unions indexed by j. Each
union j consists of all the consumers in the economy with labor of type j. This union
realizes that it faces a downward sloping demand curve for its type of labor. It sets
nominal wages for N periods at t, t + N, t + 2N, and so on. Thus, it faces constraints
W(j;st 1) = W(j;st) = ::: = W(j;st+N 1)
W(j;st+N) = W(j;st+N+1) = ::: = W(j;st+2N 1)
and so on in addition to the ones I describe below.




















which allows for habit persistence and preference shocks ('), subject to the sequence of
budget constraints, the denition of labor supply, and the labor demands of the rms:













Ld(i;st); for all i:
17There are also borrowing constraints B(st+1)   P(st)b. M and B are consumers' hold-
ings of money and contingent claims, Q is the price of the claims, W(j;st 1) is the nominal
wage chosen by one cohort of consumers,  are prots, and T are government transfers.
The consumer agrees to supply whatever is demanded at that wage chosen.
The government in this world behaves in such a way that the nominal interest rate
set by the Federal Reserve is given by
r(st) = a0[r(st 1);r(st 2);r(st 3);Et log(P(st+1)=P(st));
log(P(st)=P(st 1));log(P(st 1)=P(st 2));log(P(st 2)=P(st 3));
logy(st);logy(st 1);logy(st 2)] + constant + r;t: (A:8)







x(i;st)di + g(st): (A:9)
For the simulations in Figure 4 and 5, I set N = 4, N = 2, U(c;c 1;l;m) = log(c  
:42c 1)  l1:8=1:8 +:0076m 1:56=( 1:56),  = :9, v = :87,  = 1=3,  = :971=4, Eg(st) = :6,
 = 1   :921=4, and (x=k) = 10(x=k   )2. The Taylor rule in (A:8) is that estimated by
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000).
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